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Abstract: False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards,
they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet, some epistemologists think that,
while one’s evidence is normative (i.e.,  one’s available evidence affects the doxastic
states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one’s false beliefs cannot be
evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating
false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs, and holding that only the latter may
be evidence. I argue that this is puzzling: If misleading evidence and false beliefs share
so many important similarities, why treat them differently? I also argue that, given the
striking similarities between false beliefs and misleading evidence, many arguments for
the factivity of evidence overgeneralize. That is, if these arguments were conclusive,
they  would  also  entail  that  the  evidence  cannot  be  misleading.  But  this  is  an
overgeneralization, since the evidence can be misleading.
Keywords:  evidence,  epistemic reasons,  epistemic normativity,  internalism,  externalism,
misleading evidence
Suppose you believe (or you are highly confident) that Boris is British for the sole
putative reason that he was born in London. The fact that someone was born is London
makes it very likely that he or she is British. However, this reason could be misleading:
Perhaps Boris was born in London, but he is not British. Or perhaps this proposition is
false. That is, perhaps Boris was not even born in London. If you came to learn that “Boris
was born in London” is a misleading fact or a false proposition, the support for your belief
that Boris is British would be defeated. Believing in accordance with false propositions or
misleading facts does not get us closer to the truth.
Misleading  facts  and  false  propositions  or  beliefs  have  striking  similarities.
Essentially, they are obstacles to epistemic success. That is, responsiveness to misleading
facts or false beliefs are obstacles to finding the truth. As thinkers who want to get closer to
the truth, we find them epistemically undesirable. 
If we take the striking similarities between misleading facts and false propositions
seriously, we are faced with a puzzle. Many epistemologists think that one’s evidence is
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normative, in the sense that one’s available evidence affects which doxastic states one is
epistemically  permitted  or  required  to  have.1 Since  there  are  misleading  facts,  there  is
misleading evidence. So, they also think that the misleading facts that are part of one’s
evidence are normative. However, these epistemologists also think that false beliefs cannot
be part of an agent’s evidence and cannot be normative (Williamson 2000; Littlejohn 2012;
Kiesewetter 2017; Lord 2018). These epistemologists have offered various motivations for
treating false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs,  and holding that  only the
latter may be evidence. In this paper, I argue that these motivations overgeneralize, and also
recommend  denying  that  misleading  true  beliefs  can  be  evidence.  But  this  is  an
overgeneralization, since the evidence can be misleading.
Section 1 presents  this  problem more fully.  Sections 2 to  4 discuss six  popular
arguments for the factivity of evidence that rely (implicitly or explicitly) on the epistemic
undesirability of false beliefs. If we take the striking similarities between misleading facts
and false beliefs seriously, we see that these arguments overgeneralize: They entail not only
that false propositions cannot be evidence, but that the evidence cannot be misleading. But
this is problematic, since the evidence can be misleading. Agents can know some facts that
point  in  the  wrong direction.  Section  5 analyzes  the  plausibility  of  views according to
which one’s evidence is normative but one’s false beliefs cannot be normative.
1. The Argument
1.1. The Similarities Between False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence
Consider the following cases:
Bad Case. Unbeknownst to Debby, she is under the influence of a powerful hallucinogen. 
The drug is very powerful and the illusions are perfect. It seems to her that it is raining 
1 The type of ought under discussion is left open. The deliberative ought has to do with “reasons that matter
in first-personal deliberation” (Kiesewetter 2017, 13). By way of contrast, the ought of advice has to do
with reasons that matter if I were to receive advices from a well-informed third party. See Wedgwood
(2015; 2017, 89–94) on the various types of ought. These types of ought are not necessarily incompatible
with each other. Some authors are interested with the natural process by which agents come to acquire
knowledge, while others are concerned with how agents should deliberate.  This gives rise to various
understandings  of  “ought”  that  are  perfectly  legitimate  depending  on  the  kind  of  problem  we  are
interested with. See Littlejohn (2012), Sylvan (m.s.) or Worsnip (2016), for example.
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outside (but this is an illusion). Accordingly, she has a high degree of confidence in the 
proposition “the sidewalks are slippery tonight,” or she believes this proposition.
Good Case. Becky is Debby’s internal duplicate. However, she is not deceived. She knows 
that it is raining outside. Accordingly, she has a high degree of confidence in the 
proposition “the sidewalks are slippery tonight,” or she believes this proposition.2
In the Bad Case Debby is hallucinating. It is not a fact that it is raining outside.
Since she is responsive to illusions and mere appearances, she is drawn away from the
truth, and her beliefs are false. In the remainder of this paper, when I refer to false beliefs, I
am interested in the kind of beliefs agents like Debby have. That is, I will be interested in
false beliefs that are sensitive to phenomenal experiences, seemings, or appearances in bad
cases.
In  the  Good  Case,  things  are  different.  Becky  has  evidence  supporting  the
conclusion that the sidewalks are slippery. The fact that it is raining makes it very likely
that  the  sidewalks  are  slippery.  However,  they  could  be  safe.  Perhaps  unbeknownst  to
Becky,  the city has placed anti-slid strips on sidewalks.  In this  case,  the fact that  it  is
raining is pointing in the wrong direction. It will draw an evidence-responsive agent away
from the  truth. We  can  say  that,  in  such  cases,  the  evidence  is  misleading. Cases  of
misleading evidence can take different forms. Think of true but improbable events (it is a
fact that I am unlikely to win the lottery, but as it happens I will win), cases of misleading
testimony from reliable sources (it is a fact that the testifier is unlikely to be wrong, but as it
happens he or she is wrong), and so forth. In these situations, some facts are pointing in the
wrong direction, and so are misleading.
Some philosophers  think that, while the evidence can be misleading, sufficient or
decisive evidence for believing P cannot be misleading (Littlejohn 2012, chap. 4). Perhaps
the fact that it is raining tonight is insufficient or indecisive evidence, and Becky should not
believe, on such a ground, that the sidewalks are slippery outside. 
However, recall that belief is not the only doxastic state agents can have. In addition
to having beliefs that can be true or false, agents have credences, or degrees of belief, that
2 This case is inspired by Kiesewetter (2017, 162).
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can be accurate or inaccurate.3 When agents acquire evidence supporting the conclusion
that  P,  they  can form the  belief  that  P,  but  they  can also merely  raise  their  degree  of
confidence in P. Perhaps misleading evidence to believe P cannot be decisive evidence to
believe P. But surely, misleading evidence can raise an agent’s degree of confidence in a
false proposition.
Suppose  Becky’s  evidence  does  not  warrant  believing  the  proposition  “the
sidewalks  are  slippery  tonight.”  However,  this  information  can  raise  her  degree  of
confidence in this proposition. After all, the fact that it is raining outside makes it more
likely that the sidewalks are slippery. However, raising her degree of confidence in this
proposition can increase her degree of inaccuracy. That is, she can have a higher degree of
belief in a false proposition, or a lower degree of confidence in a true proposition. Again,
responsiveness to misleading facts draws agents away from the truth. The evidence can be
misleading.
False beliefs and misleading evidence share many similarities.  In many regards,
they are both epistemically undesirable.  They are obstacles to  responsible inquiry,  they
undermine successful  deliberation,  they  compromise reliability,  and so forth.  Here is  a
tentative list of similarities between the two:
 Responsible  Inquiry  and  Deliberation.  Suppose  that,  when  thinkers  deliberate,  they
should be epistemically responsible. Specifically, in the course of inquiry, they should
do their best for searching and finding the truth.4 False beliefs and misleading evidence
are  obstacles  to  finding  the  truth.  So,  responsible  thinkers  should  treat  them  as
undesirable, and ignore them when they recognize them as such. Relatedly, suppose
that,  when  thinkers  deliberate,  they  should  care  about  the  truth.  Accordingly,  they
should treat considerations that might deceive them as undesirable, and try to ignore
them. False beliefs and misleading evidence deceive agents. So, thinkers should try to
ensure that they do not rely on beliefs that are false or evidence that is misleading
3 Agents  improve the  accuracy  of  their  credences  when  they  raise  their  degree  of  confidence  in  true
propositions, or lower their degree of confidence in false propositions.
4 Cloos (2015), Peels and Booth (2014).
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 Defeat. Suppose that, when thinkers deliberate, they should be sensitive to defeaters.5
Very  roughly,  a  defeater  is  a  condition  in  which  one’s  evidence  or  beliefs  do  not
support  believing  P  anymore.  Among  these  conditions,  coming  to  know  that  my
evidence for believing P is misleading, or that my beliefs supporting the conclusion that
P were false, are defeaters for believing P. In the presence of such defeaters, agents do
not take their misleading evidence or their false beliefs to support the conclusion that P.
 Reliability: Suppose agents aim at optimizing their ratio of true to false beliefs.6 False
beliefs and responsiveness to misleading evidence will not improve their ratio of true to
false beliefs. Agents who reason from false beliefs or respond to misleading evidence
are likely to reach the wrong answer on various issues. So, if agents want to be reliable,
they also want to avoid false beliefs and misleading evidence.
 Safety and Knowledge. Suppose agents are permitted to believe P only if they can truly
and safely believe P.7 Safety entails that, if agents truly believe P, they could not easily
have  falsely  believed  P.  Responsiveness  to  false  beliefs  and  misleading  evidence
undermines the satisfaction of the safety condition. The more agents have false beliefs
and misleading evidence supporting P, the easier it is for them to falsely believe P. So,
in  order  to  satisfy  the  safety  condition,  agents  ought  to  avoid  false  beliefs  and
misleading evidence. The same goes for knowledge. Suppose agents ought to believe P
only  if  they  are  in  a  position to  know that  P.8 Responsiveness  to  false  beliefs  and
misleading evidence undermines the knowledge condition. The more agents have false
beliefs and misleading evidence, the easier it is for them to falsely believe P (and thus
not be in a position to know that P).
 Final epistemic value. Suppose that truth (or knowledge) has final epistemic value.9
Misleading  evidence  and  false  beliefs  are  not  conducive  to  truth  (or  knowledge).
Responsiveness to misleading evidence and false beliefs brings agents away from the
truth (and thus undermine knowledge, for which truth is a necessary condition). In that
5 Schroeder (2011).
6 Goldman (1986).
7 Pritchard (2007; 2008).
8 Williamson (2002).
9 Bondy (2015), Goldman (2015), Horwich (2006).
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regard, both misleading evidence and false beliefs are not conducive of final epistemic
value.
This is  just a sample.  The list  of epistemic desiderata that false beliefs and misleading
evidence both fail to satisfy could go on. I think the point I am making is obvious enough to
stop here.
Some of the above desiderata are typical of internalist theories of epistemic norms
(like epistemic responsibility, good first-personal deliberation, or sensitivity to defeaters).
Others  are  typical  of  externalist  theories  (like  reliability,  safety,  or  knowledge).
Epistemologists,  whether  they  lean  towards  internalism or  externalism about  epistemic
norms, think that agents would be better off if they did not respond to their false beliefs and
misleading evidence.10 Thinkers do not value being wrong or misled: It is something they
endure. Epistemically speaking, thinkers would prefer not having false beliefs and ignoring
their misleading evidence.
1.2. The Puzzle: Why Treat False Beliefs Differently from Misleading Evidence?
Epistemologists have substantive disagreements on the following two questions: First, can
some false beliefs be evidence? Second, can some false beliefs be normative (i.e., can some
of  an  agent’s  false  beliefs  matter  for  determining his  or  her  epistemic  obligations  and
permissions)? If  we combine  the possible  answers  to  these two questions,  we get  four
possible views, as in the following:
10 See, e.g., Simion, Kelp, and Ghijsen (2016).
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Table 1: Views on Putative “False Evidence” and the Normativity of False Beliefs




Some false beliefs 
are evidence
Normative Falsies: 
Comesaña (2018), Fantl and
McGrath (2009), Gibbons














Three out of four possible views are represented in print. According to Normative Truthers,
an agent’s evidence does not include false beliefs or propositions, but some false beliefs
can be normative (qua apparent evidence, for instance). This view is endorsed by Parfit
(2011) and Sylvan (2015; forthcoming). For  Normative Falsies, an agent’s evidence can
include false beliefs or propositions, and these falsehoods can be normative. This view is
endorsed, among others, by Comesaña (2018), Gibbons (2013), Fantl and McGrath (2009),
and Conee and Feldman (2004). Schroeder (2008) might also endorse this view, depending
on how to  interpret  his  concept  of  “subjective  evidence.”11 Finally,  according to  Non-
Normative Truthers, an agent’s evidence does not include false beliefs or propositions, and
11 There are two ways to interpret Schroeder’s view. First, perhaps “subjective” is an adjective qualifying
the evidence. So, subjective evidence would be part of one’s evidence. But perhaps “subjective” is here
meant to distinguish real evidence from subjective evidence. Schroeder would then refer to what Sylvan
(2015) and Parfit (2011, 34) call “apparent evidence.” Sylvan and Parfit think that, while the evidence is
factive, apparent evidence can include false propositions. So, there are two different interpretations of
Schroeder’s view: One entails that there can be false evidence, and the other doesn’t. See also Whiting
(2018, 2197). 
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false beliefs cannot be normative. This view is endorsed by Littlejohn (2012), Williamson
(2002), Kiesewetter (2017), and Lord (2018).12 Perhaps Mitova (2017) endorses this view.13
The divide between Normative Truthers and Normative Falsies is subtle. Both of
them think that false beliefs matter for an agent’s epistemic permissions and obligations.
But for various reasons, Normative Truthers prefer to regiment the concept of evidence so
as to only include facts.
For instance, facts can explain why a proposition is true, or why an agent formed or
revised his or her doxastic states. Falsehoods lack this explanatory power.14 Accordingly,
epistemologists  might  want  a  concept  that  has  both  explanatory  power  and  a  role  in
normative  evaluation,  and  thus  reserve  the  concept  of  evidence  to  facts.15 Relatedly,
sensitivity  to  facts  or  the  environment  is  essential  to  many  externalist  accounts  of
justification.16 Accordingly, externalists might want a factive concept to express what they
have in mind, and, for this purpose, regiment the concept of evidence to facts. There could
be other reasons to restrict the concept of evidence to facts. Williamson (2000, chap. 9)
suggests  that,  if  we want  to  know what  evidence  consists  in,  we need to  consider  the
contextual function of evidence (in contexts where evidence-responsiveness is important,
like science). Littlejohn (2012, sec. 3.3.6) and Mitova (2017, 95) argue that restricting the
concept  of  evidence  to  facts  brings  greater  conceptual  unity  between  theoretical  and
practical reason (since practical reasons are typically understood as facts). Sylvan (m.s.)
suggests that our concepts should square well with the distinction between justification (and
sensitivity to evidence or reasons) and rationality (and sensitivity to  apparent evidence or
apparent reasons). 
12 Although  Lord  (2018)  and  Kiesewetter  (2017)  argue  that,  in  cases  where  they  are  deceived,  facts
concerning an agent’s seemings and appearances can be backup evidence. Kiesewetter thinks that, in the
absence of defeaters, the fact that it seems to an agent that P and the fact that P are equally strong reasons
(Kiesewetter 2017, sec. 7.5). Williamson (2000) and Littlejohn (2012, chap. 3) reject this claim.
13 Mitova (2017, chap. 9) argues that evidence is factive and has normative authority. But this is compatible
with thinking that some false beliefs also have normative authority.
14 See, e.g.,  Littlejohn (2012, 103; 2013a) and Lord (2018, 81-6).  However,  Lord’s argument primarily
concerns reasons, not evidence.
15 See Fogal (2018, sec. 11.4) for discussion.
16 Schellenberg  (2016),  for  instance,  is  interested  in  the  kind  of  evidence  that  is  determined  by  the
environment, and thus is guaranteed to depict it.
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So, for Normative Truthers, we can make a conceptual distinction between evidence
and false beliefs (or between evidence and apparent evidence). However, the distinction has
limited import for normative issues. We can regiment the concept of evidence so as to only
include facts without also saying that false beliefs have no normative status.17
The  divide  between  Normative  Falsies  and  Non-Normative  Truthers  is  deeper.
Many  Non-Normative  Truthers  think  that  an  agent’s  available  evidence  affects  which
doxastic  states  he  or  she  is  epistemically  permitted  or  required  to  have.  For  instance,
Littlejohn  argues  that  one’s  evidence  consists  in  the  true  propositions  one  justifiably
believes (2012, chap. 4), and that justification is tied to epistemic permissibility (2012, 4).18
Lord and Kiesewetter argue that evidence is factive, and that what agents are epistemically
permitted  and required  to  believe  is  solely  determined  by  their  possessed  or  available
evidence  (Lord  2014,  155;  Lord  2018,  secs.  8.3-8.4;  Kiesewetter  2017,  chaps.  7-8).
Williamson says that an agent’s evidence consists in the propositions he or she is in a
position to know (2000, chap. 9). For Williamson, knowledge matters for determining what
agents are epistemically permitted to believe, or the degrees of belief they are epistemically
permitted to have (2000, sec. 1.5; forthcoming b).19
However, Non-Normative Truthers deny that agents are permitted or required to
proportion  their  beliefs  and  credences  to  some  of  their  false  beliefs.  For  instance,
Kiesewetter  rejects  Parfit’s  claim that  an agent’s  false,  apparent  evidence  is  normative
(2017, sec. 5.6). Littlejohn says that justification is tied to permissibility (2012, 4), and that
there  are  no  justified  false  beliefs  (2012,  sec.  4.2).  Williamson  thinks  that,  if  one  is
epistemically  permitted  to  believe  P,  then  one  is  in  a  position  to  know that  P,  which
excludes false beliefs or propositions (2000, 47).20
17 But  see  Gerken  (2018)  for  a  worry—namely,  that  some  of  the  motivations  underlying  epistemic
externalism are compatible with the denial of the factivity of evidence.
18 Littlejohn (2013b, 310) now ties epistemic permissibility to knowledge.
19 On epistemic permissibility and degrees of belief, Williamson says that an agent’s evidence consists in
his or her knowledge. He endorses the Principal Principle, which roughly says that agents are required to
proportion their credences to their knowledge of the objective probabilities. So, in a standard lottery case,
Becky’s credences are constrained by her knowledge of her ticket’s chance of winning. If Becky bought
the winning ticket, but had a low chance of winning, her credences will be constrained by misleading
evidence. See Williamson (forthcoming b).
20 See also Williamson (forthcoming a, esp. note 18) for a clarification of his earlier views concerning the
connection between epistemic permissibility and knowledge.
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Here is  the problem. False beliefs  and misleading evidence are similar  in  many
regards. Essentially, they are both epistemically undesirable. Accordingly, why think that
that misleading facts can be normative evidence but that false beliefs cannot? The puzzle is
to explain this distinction, even if it is hard to find a relevant difference between misleading
evidence and false beliefs. This is a problem for Non-Normative Truthers, since, as we just
saw,  many of  them think that  an agent’s  evidence (including  misleading evidence)21 is
normative  but  false  beliefs  cannot  be  normative.  By  contrast,  Normative  Truthers  and
Normative Falsies do not commit to this asymmetry. They accept that both false beliefs and
misleading evidence can be normative.
More precisely, the puzzle for Non-Normative Truthers is that the following theses
are in tension:
1. Evidence is  normative (i.e.,  an agent’s available  evidence affects  what he or she is
epistemically permitted or required to believe);
2. Misleading evidence and false beliefs have many striking similarities;
3. False beliefs are not part of an agent’s evidence and they are not normative.
Non-Normative Truthers endorse 1 and 3. However, these claims are in tension with 2. If
we take the similarities between misleading evidence and false beliefs seriously, we should
reject  the  normative  authority  of  evidence,  or  accept  that  some  false  beliefs  can  be
normative. 
The problem is especially clear when taking a closer look at  existing arguments
against  the  claim  that  false  beliefs  can  be  evidence.  Many  of  these  arguments  stress
(implicitly or explicitly) the epistemic undesirability of false beliefs. They conclude, from
this  observation,  that  false  beliefs  cannot  be  part  of  an  agent’s  evidence.  Given  the
similarities between false beliefs and misleading evidence, these arguments are likely to
overgeneralize,  and lead to the conclusion that no evidence can be misleading. But the
evidence  can be  misleading.  So,  the  problem  is  this:  Either  these  arguments  are
21 See, e.g., Kiesewetter (2017, 162, 167) and Lord (2018, 53, 218). Kiesewetter’s “Backup View” (2017,
sect. 7.5) also strongly suggests that misleading evidence can be a source of normative reasons. See also
note 19.
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inconclusive,  or  they  entail  the  problematic  conclusion  that  no  evidence  can  be
misleading.22
In the next sections, I examine six arguments for the factivity of evidence and argue
that they overgeneralize in a problematic way.
2. Williamson’s Arguments for the Factivity of Evidence
2.1. The Argument From Epistemic Success
Williamson (2011) argues that the factivity of evidence is a natural consequence of the
explanatory  priority  of  success  in  epistemic  evaluation.  His  argument  roughly  goes  as
follows:
(P1) Epistemic norms should give explanatory priority to conditions of epistemic success.
(P2) We can evaluate an agent’s epistemic status “from the standpoint of an external 
observer, with access to information unavailable to the agent” (Williamson 2011, 211).
(P3) From the standpoint of an external observer, it is more epistemically successful to 
respond to factive evidence than to respond to false beliefs.
(C) So, evidence is factive.
A similar point can be found in Williamson’s earlier work. In  Knowledge and Its
Limits he  argues  that,  once  we  assume that  evidence  is  factive,  responsiveness  to  the
evidence has an obvious advantage (that responsiveness to false beliefs lack). He says:23
Once it is granted that all propositional evidence is true—and therefore... that
all evidence consists of true propositions—adjusting our beliefs to the evidence
has an obvious point. It is a way of adjusting them to the truth. Although true
evidence  can  still  support  false  conclusions,  it  will  tend  to  support  truths.
(Williamson 2000, 202)
22 Again, as  discussed in section 1.1,  perhaps no  sufficient or  conclusive evidence to believe P can be
misleading (Littlejohn 2012, chap. 4). However, this is compatible with thinking that the evidence can be
misleading. Consider the following example. Suppose P is extremely improbable on my evidence (say, I
know that P’s objective probability is very low). However, as it happens, P is true. Accordingly, an agent
who proportions his or her credences to the evidence will end up with highly inaccurate credences. Even
if we deny that sufficient or conclusive evidence for believing P can be misleading, there can still be
misleading  evidence  for  other  doxastic  states,  such  as  credences  (provided,  for  instance,  that  one’s
credences are constrained by one’s knowledge of the objective probabilities—see note 19).
23 See also Neta (2018, 42–47) on the factivity of evidence and truth-conduciveness. 
– 11 –
As we can see, both arguments rely on the importance of success—namely, getting closer
to the truth, or being more likely to reach the truth.
The claims made in P1 and P2 contrast with internalist accounts of epistemic norms.
Most  internalist  accounts  of  epistemic  norms have  two starting  points.  First,  epistemic
norms should be operational from a first-personal point of view. That is, if an agent cannot
identify a decidable and effective way to satisfy a given epistemic norm, then he or she
does not fall under an obligation to satisfy it. Second, evidence has no essential connection
to the truth, or other conditions of epistemic success. Knowledge-first epistemology rejects
these  starting  points.  As  we  can  see  with  Williamson’s  argument,  rejecting  these
assumptions paves the way for a vindication of the factivity of evidence.
Suppose  that  P1 and P2 were  correct.  Then,  my  contention  is  this:  If  we give
explanatory priority to epistemic success and evaluate an agent’s epistemic status from a
third-personal  point  of  view,  then  we  could  have  an  even  more restrictive  concept  of
evidence.  That  is,  P1  and  P2  provide  support  against  the  claim  that  one’s  misleading
knowledge can be part of one’s evidence.
Surely, agents who form and revise their doxastic states in accordance with their
knowledge will be somewhat successful. But they would be even more successful if they
formed  and  revised  their  doxastic  states  in  accordance  with  their  non-misleading
knowledge. So, perhaps one’s evidence should be his or her  non-misleading knowledge.
After  all,  agents who are responsive to  their  non-misleading knowledge are in  a  better
position to acquire more knowledge and improve the accuracy of their doxastic states, and
thus be successful. And as Williamson says, we can conduct epistemic evaluation “from the
standpoint of an external observer, with access to information unavailable to the agent”
(Williamson 2011, 211). If that is correct, then we can have a more restrictive account of
evidence.24
In other words, if Williamson’s argument from success is correct, then it seems that
we could argue against misleading evidence on similar grounds, as in the following:
24 Mitova (2017, chap. 9) makes similar observations. She thinks that the most popular justifications of the
normative authority of evidence stem from the epistemic value of true belief. See also Alvarez (2018,
163) on the favouring relation and good-making features.
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(P1) Epistemic norms should give explanatory priority to conditions of epistemic success.
(P2) We can evaluate an agent’s epistemic status “from the standpoint of an external 
observer, with access to information unavailable to the agent” (Williamson 2011, 211).
(P3)* From the standpoint of an external observer, it is more epistemically successful to 
respond to non-misleading evidence than to respond to misleading evidence.
(C)* So, one’s evidence cannot be misleading.
The  problem  is  that  the  evidence  can be  misleading.  (C)*  is  false.  So, Williamson’s
argument  from success  overgeneralizes:  If  we accept  (P1)  and (P2),  we are  led  to  an
implausible conclusion.
2.2. The Arguments from the Functions of Evidence
For Williamson, we can determine the properties of evidence by analyzing the functional
role of evidence in some contexts, like scientific inquiry. As he says, “any restriction on
what  counts  as  evidence  should  be  well-motivated  by  the  function of  evidence”
(Williamson 2000,  203,  emphasis  added).  Williamson does  not  tell  us  exactly  why we
should be functionalist concerning the nature of evidence. Yet, a functionalist framework
makes sense here: If we want to know what is a kidney, we can look at the function played
by kidneys for an organism. Similarly, if we want to know the nature of evidence, we can
look  at  the  function(s)  played  by  evidence  for  thinkers  who  deliberate  about  what  to
believe, or for scientists who are trying to figure out which theory is correct, and so forth.
However, functionalist frameworks are compatible with different ways of analyzing
defective tokens. Suppose Jim has an accident and his kidneys are badly injured. They do
not filter blood anymore and they cannot heal. A kidney’s function is, among other things,
to filter blood. Should we say that (i) Jim  lost his kidneys or that (ii) Jim now has  bad
kidneys? Functional analyses are compatible with both conclusions.
Those  who  are  inclined  to  say  that  Jim  has  bad  kidneys  roughly  think  that,
regardless of whether they are defective or not, Jim’s organs are supposed to filter blood.
They are simply bad at doing it. Accordingly, Jim has bad kidneys. Those who are inclined
to say that Jim lost his kidneys think that his organs do not meet the bare minimum for
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counting as kidneys. This is the threshold commitment, as described by Lindeman: “For
norm-governed kinds, an individual must at least partially satisfy the constitutive norms of
a kind, or partially meet the constitutive aim of a kind, in order to be a member of that
kind” (Lindeman 2017, 235–36). These two distinct interpretations are compatible with the
functionalist analysis of kidneys.25
Similarly,  suppose  that  evidence  has  functions  F,  where  F  can  include  guiding
agents to the truth or knowledge, confirming hypotheses, and so forth. And suppose Jim’s
beliefs  do  not  play  the  functional  roles  described  in  F.  Say,  his  beliefs  are  false  or
misleading. Misleading facts and false beliefs are bad guides to the truth. So, we could
classify both of them as bad evidence. But we could also say that misleading facts and false
beliefs cannot be evidence, because they do not even partially meet the constitutive aim of
evidence (like drawing agents closer to the truth). So, should we say that (i) Jim’s beliefs
are bad evidence, or that (ii) Jim’s beliefs are not part of his evidence?
As with the injured kidney example, those who are inclined to say that Jim has bad
evidence roughly think that, regardless of whether they are defective or not, his beliefs have
functions F. They are supposed to have features F. But as it happens, his beliefs are bad at
fulfilling these functions. Those who are inclined to say that Jim lacks evidence think that
his beliefs do not meet some sort of bare functional minimum. A minimal threshold (in
terms  of  truth-conduciveness,  confirmation,  etc.)  is  not  met  by  such  beliefs.  Both
interpretations are compatible with the functionalist analysis of evidence.
With these remarks in mind, we can take a closer look at Williamson’s functionalist
arguments.  His  first  argument  stems  from  the  function  of  evidence  for  confirming
hypotheses. He writes:
When we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* because h explains our
evidence e better than h* does, we are standardly assuming e to be known; if we
do  not  know  e,  why  should  h’s  capacity  to  explain  e  confirm  h  for  us?
(Williamson 2000, 200)
25 See Lindeman (2017) for discussion on both interpretations. See also Ehrenberg (2016, chap. 2) on a
distinction between membership and success (e.g., there could be necessary conditions for being a kidney,
and additional conditions for being a good kidney).
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At first sight, the argument has traction. If one’s evidence were false, one would have no
clear reason to prefer the hypothesis that better explain one’s evidence. 
However, when we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* (because h explains
our evidence better), we also typically assume that our evidence is not misleading. Yet this
does not lead us (and Williamson) to conclude that the evidence cannot be misleading. 
Here  is  another  way to  put  it.  Williamson’s  first  functionalist  argument  for  the
factivity of evidence goes as follows: 
(P1) Suppose we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* because h explains our 
evidence e better than h* does.
(P2) Assuming we did not know e, we would doubt that h’s capacity to explain e confirm h 
for us.
(C) So, given P1 and P2, e is known (and factive).
However, this argument is structurally similar to the following:
(P1) Suppose we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* because h explains our 
evidence e better than h* does.
(P2)* Assuming e were misleading, we would doubt that h’s capacity to explain e confirm 
h for us.
(C)* So, given P1 and P2*, e is not misleading.
Those who accept P2 should also accept P2*. Just as we should doubt that P explains H in
cases where P is a false proposition, we should doubt that P explains H in cases where P is
a misleading fact. But clearly, (C)* is mistaken. There can be misleading evidence. So,
Williamson’s argument overgeneralizes.
Williamson’s second functionalist  argument stems from the relationship between
truth and evidence. He writes:
If one’s evidence included falsehoods, it would rule out some truths, by being
inconsistent with them. One’s evidence may make some truths improbable, but
it should not exclude any outright. (Williamson 2000, 201)
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Williamson is here introducing a restriction  on the concept of evidence: He says that the
evidence should not exclude truths outright. But recall that, for Williamson, restrictions on
the concept of evidence should come from its function. Responsiveness to the evidence is
supposed to bring agents closer to the truth or knowledge. This is one of the functions of
evidence: Just as (good) kidneys filter blood, (good) evidence gets us closer to the truth or
knowledge.
As I said earlier,  those who accept the functionalist  analysis of evidence should
think  that  there  is  something  wrong  with  putative  false  evidence.  In  accordance  with
Williamson’s remarks, false beliefs are clearly defective: They do not bring agents closer to
the truth, and they are inconsistent with some truths. But does this entail that evidence
cannot be false? Not necessarily. Functionalists could think that, since false propositions
are  inconsistent  with  some  truths,  false  beliefs  are  bad or  undesirable evidence  (a
conclusion  that  many  philosophers  would  agree  with).  One can  embrace  functionalism
about evidence and think that false beliefs can be part of one’s evidence.
Williamson could object, in accordance with the threshold commitment, that false
beliefs do not meet the  bare functional minimum to count as evidence. If that is correct,
then false beliefs cannot be evidence. However, misleading facts also draw agents away
from the truth. They can make some truths extremely improbable. So, one could also argue,
on  the  same  ground,  that  misleading  facts  or  beliefs  do  not  meet  the  bare  functional
minimum to count as evidence. But this would be an overgeneralization. The evidence can
be misleading. Agents can be in a position to know some propositions that will draw them
away from the truth.
Perhaps Williamson thinks that misleading evidence is  bad evidence, while false
beliefs cannot be evidence. But from a functionalist point of view, there is no reason why
we should  classify  misleading facts  differently  from false  beliefs.  If  we think  that  the
function of evidence is to get us closer to the truth or knowledge, misleading beliefs and
false beliefs are both defective  for the same reasons. So, if restrictions on the concept of
evidence come from its function, there is no reason why, on the one hand, one’s evidence
may make some truths extremely improbable, but on the other hand, it should not exclude
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them. In both cases, the evidence does not play its functional role of getting agents closer to
the truth.
Williamson  could  then  respond  that  misleading  facts  meet  the  bare  functional
minimum because they are facts, and only facts can stand in explanatory relations between
true  propositions  or  events.  Accordingly,  misleading  facts  can  stand  in  explanatory
relations,  but  falsehoods cannot.  My response  to  this  objection  goes  as  follows:  If  the
evidence  for  believing  P  is  misleading,  there  is  no  explanatory  relation  between  the
evidence and P. That is, when the evidence for believing P is misleading, P is false, and so
there  cannot  be  an  explanatory  relation  between the  evidence  and what  it  supports.  If
explanatory relations were part of the function of evidence and constrained its nature, this
would strongly suggest that the evidence cannot be misleading. But again, this would be an
overgeneralization: The evidence can be misleading.26
3. Littlejohn’s Linguistic Observations
According  to  Littlejohn  (2012,  sec.  3.3.5),  some  linguistic  observations  suggest  that
evidence is factive. To see why, consider the following assertions:
(1) “I believe Q for the reason that P, but I don’t know that P.”
(2) “I believe I should believe Q for the reason that P, but I don’t know that P.”
For Littlejohn, these assertions sound contradictory. If such assertions are incoherent, there
must be a problem with claiming that one’s evidence cannot be known. This “linguistic
evidence”  suggests  that  epistemic  reasons,  like  one’s  evidence,  are  known.  Since
knowledge is factive, then so too is one’s evidence (Littlejohn 2012, 102-3). 
26 A variant of this objection goes as follows: Only facts can explain why an agent is permitted to have
doxastic attitude D towards P. My response to this variant of the objection roughly goes as follows: Of
course, there must be some facts explaining why agents are epistemically permitted to form or revise
some of their beliefs. But there are facts concerning one’s false beliefs, and these facts can explain why
agents are permitted to have doxastic attitude D towards P. If A falsely believes that P, it is a fact that A
falsely believes that P, and this fact can explain (in part) why A is permitted to believe what is entailed by
P. The “factivity” at stake in this variant of the objection does not preclude that false beliefs matter for
determining one’s epistemic permissions and obligations. I thank a referee for inviting me to discuss these
objections on behalf of Williamson.
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The problem is that, if (1) or (2) are incoherent, then the following assertions are
also incoherent:
(3) “I believe Q for the reason that P, but P is misleading evidence for believing Q.”
(4) “I believe I should believe Q for the reason that P, but P is misleading evidence for 
believing Q.”
If agents who assert (1) or (2) are incoherent, then agents who asserts (3) or (4) also display
some kind of incoherence.27 If P is misleading evidence for believing Q, then believing Q
for the reason that P does not make sense. So, if we take the linguistic evidence in (1) and
(2) to suggest that evidence is known, we should also take the linguistic evidence in (3) and
(4)  to  suggest  that  the  evidence  cannot  be  misleading.  Again,  the  problem is  that  the
evidence can be misleading. So, these linguistic observations overgeneralize.
Littlejohn discusses other linguistic practices which suggest that evidence is factive.
Consider the following case (Littlejohn 2012, 104):
HARRY: Do they have solid evidence against Leo?
GORDON: They think they do. Here’s the evidence they have: that he was the last one to 
see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the crime, that his
fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing details the 
police think only the killer could have known.
HARRY: But didn’t you say that he wasn’t the last person to see him alive and his 
fingerprints couldn’t have been on the weapon?
GORDON: That’s right. He also didn’t lie about his whereabouts and wasn’t the last one to 
see him alive.
Littlejohn takes Gordon’s admission that the putative evidence is false to be puzzling. It
seems that, if the propositions asserted by Gordon are false, they cannot be part of the solid
evidence against Leo. So, these linguistic observations suggest that evidence is factive.
Suppose, as Littlejohn suggests, that Gordon and Leo’s linguistic practices lent support to
the  claim that  evidence  is  factive.  Once again,  the problem is  that  this  kind of  linguistic
27 See also Chevarie-Cossette (2019) on a similar problem.
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evidence  would  overgeneralize.  There  is  also  something  odd  with  the  following
conversation:
HARRY: Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Leo?
GORDON: They think they do. Here’s the evidence they have: that he was the last one to 
see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the crime, and 
that his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing 
details the police think only the killer could have known.
HARRY (revised): But didn’t you say that all of these facts are misleading, and that we can
prove Leo’s innocence?
GORDON (revised): That’s right. All the facts available to the prosecution are misleading. 
We can easily prove Leo’s innocence, and that the evidence for his guilt is misleading. 
But the prosecution still has solid evidence against Leo. 
What is puzzling in the above conversation is that, if the prosecution has solid evidence
against Leo, Gordon should not be in a position to easily prove that Leo is innocent. There
is something puzzling with claiming, on the one hand, that there is solid evidence against
Leo, and claiming, on the other hand, that this evidence is misleading. 
So, there is something odd with these assertions. However, no one would conclude
from this observation that the evidence cannot be misleading. Some facts do point in the
wrong direction, and responsiveness to these facts draws agents away from the truth. So,
these linguistic observations overgeneralize. They are not good indicators of the nature of
evidence.
4. Mitova’s Arguments for the Factivity of Evidence
4.1. A Note on Mitova’s Argument
In  Believable  Evidence (2017),  Mitova  argues  that  evidence  consists  of  veridical
psychological states. Her view offers a compromise between propositional factualism (like
Williamson (2000), who thinks that an agent’s evidence consists of his or her knowledge)
and psychologism (like Conee and Feldman (2004), who think that an agent’s evidence
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consists of his or her mental states). Her argument for the factivity of evidence is presented
in chapter 4. It goes as follows:
(P1) Normative reasons for belief are psychological states.
(P2) Content-related normative reasons for believing P speak in favour of the truth of P.
(P3) Non-veridical psychological states don’t genuinely speak in favour of the truth of a 
proposition.
(C1) So, only veridical psychological states can be content-related normative reasons for 
belief.
(P4) The evidence for P is a content-related normative reason to believe that P.28
(C) So, only veridical psychological states can be evidence.29
The key step in her argument for denying that false propositions can be evidence is
P3. So, we will analyze the arguments favouring P3.  In the remainder of this section, I
discuss two arguments Mitova gives for P3. I argue, once again, that these considerations
overgeneralize to misleading evidence.
4.2. Falsehoods and Speaking in Favour of the Truth of A Proposition
Mitova’s first argument for P3 is that it seems to be a platitude. There is a sense in which a
perceptual illusion or a false belief cannot “really speak in favour of the truth of anything”
(Mitova 2017, 94). In order to stress this point, she then offers the following case:
False  Belief:  “Suppose  I  truly  believe  that  either  you  or  Baingana  left
chocolates  on  my doorstep  during  the  night,  and that  I  falsely  believe  that
Baingana did. Clearly, my false belief that he did cannot speak in favour of the
28 Those who are familiar with Mitova’s views might find P4 puzzling. In chapter 7 of Believable Evidence,
when discussing the case of an agent who possesses misleading evidence, she writes that “[the agent’s
belief] is not based on good reasons; it is, instead, based on misleading evidence” (Mitova 2017, 181). On
page  182,  she  says  that  “misleading  evidence...  is  in  the  ballpark  of  good  reasons—it  is  evidence
manqué....” This seems to contradict the claim that the evidence for believing P is a normative reason to
believe P. So, why not replace P4 with something like: “The non-misleading evidence for a proposition is
a good reason to believe that proposition”? 
I will not take a stance on this issue. But note that, if only the non-misleading evidence to believe P is a
good reason to believe P, then the argument of chapter 4 should be reformulated as follows: 
(P1) Normative reasons for belief are psychological states.
(P2) Content-related normative reasons for believing P speak in favour of the truth of P.
(P3) Non-veridical psychological states don’t genuinely speak in favour of the truth of a proposition.
(C1) So, only veridical psychological states can be content-related normative reasons for belief.
(P4)* The non-misleading evidence for P is a content-related normative reason to believe that P.
(C)* So, only veridical psychological states can be non-misleading evidence.
This revised argument does not support the conclusion that evidence is factive—it merely supports the
conclusion that non-misleading evidence is factive. I here ignore this complication, since I wish to engage
with a version of her argument that entails the factivity of evidence tout court.
29 Mitova (2017, chap. 4).
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truth of the proposition 'You didn’t leave chocolates on my doorstep'.  If the
belief is false, then Baingana didn’t leave the chocolates.” (Mitova 2017, 94)
There is  a sense in which false beliefs do not speak in favour of the truth of a
proposition: An observer with all the relevant information regarding P would not think that
one’s  false  beliefs  support  the  conclusion  that  P.  However,  the  same could  be  said  of
misleading evidence: An observer with all the relevant information regarding P would not
think that one’s  misleading evidence for believing P supports the conclusion that P. For
instance, if the observer knows that the evidence for believing P is misleading, he or she
would not become more confident, on the evidence, that P.
Consider the following case. It is identical to False Belief, with the exception that
the belief is misleading instead of false:
Misleading Belief: I truly believe that either you or Baingana left chocolates on
my doorstep last night. However, I believe that there is a 99.9% chance that
Baingana  did  (Or  perhaps  I  believe  that  Baingana  is  the  only  person  who
regularly left  chocolates on my doorstep for the past several years).  But the
proposition I believe is misleading, since Baingana did not leave the chocolates
on my doorstep last night. As with false beliefs, there is a sense in which the
misleading proposition I believe does not speak in favour of the truth of the
proposition  'You  didn’t  leave  chocolates  on  my  doorstep'.  If  the  believed
proposition is misleading (i.e., if the content of my belief points in the wrong
direction), then Baingana didn’t leave the chocolates.
In False Belief, Mitova’s intuition seems to be motivated by the fact that, if my belief is
false, then Baingana did not leave the chocolates. However, if the content of my belief is
misleading, then Baingana did not leave the chocolates. Her case against false evidence
generalizes against misleading evidence. So, her argument overgeneralizes.
4.3. The Argument From the Phenomenology of Deliberation
Mitova’s  second  argument  against  false  evidence  comes  from  the  phenomenology  of
deliberation. She writes:
[The  impossibility  of  false  evidence]  is  faithful  to  the  phenomenology  of
deliberation. When I take a consideration to favour an action or a belief, I take
that consideration to obtain. The moment it is shown to me that it doesn’t, I stop
thinking  that  it  favours  the  action  or  belief....  So,  the  phenomenology  of
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reflecting on our reasons supports the thesis that false beliefs don’t genuinely
favour action or belief. (Mitova 2017, 95)
For Mitova, when agents take some proposition to favour or support a conclusion, they take
this consideration to be a fact (or a true proposition). If they learn that the proposition is
false, they immediately stop thinking that the proposition supports a conclusion. According
to  her,  the  best  explanation  of  this  observation  concerning  the  phenomenology  of
deliberation is that evidence cannot be false. In view of the foregoing, she concludes that
evidence cannot be false.
However, there is also a sense in which misleading facts do not square well with the
phenomenology of deliberation. Suppose, once again, that I truly believe that either you or
Baingana left chocolates on my doorstep last night. I misleadingly believe that there is a
99.9% chance that Baingana did. Then, I come to learn that you left the chocolates on my
doorstep. Since I have this new information, I immediately stop thinking that the fact that
there was a 99.9% chance that Baingana left the chocolates favours the conclusion that
Baingana did it. That is, upon learning new information, I take my misleading evidence to
be defeated.  I  revise the support relation between the proposition “There was a  99.9%
chance that Baingana left the chocolates” and “Baingana did it.”
From a phenomenological point of view, false beliefs and misleading beliefs have
striking similarities: Agents take these considerations to be defeated once they realize they
are false or misleading. Also, agents take these considerations to be obstacles to successful
deliberation.  If  Mitova’s  argument  from  the  phenomenology  of  deliberation  were
conclusive, we should also conclude that the evidence cannot be misleading. But some facts
do point in the wrong direction. The argument overgeneralizes.30
5. Conclusion
Epistemically  speaking,  misleading  evidence  and  false  beliefs  are  both  undesirable.
Responding to misleading evidence, or believing in accordance with what it entailed by our
30 Mitova also offers a third argument for the factivity of evidence. This argument roughly says that a
factive account of evidence allows for greater conceptual unity between practical and epistemic reasons.
See section 1 and the conclusion for a short discussion of these types of arguments.
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false beliefs, is not truth-conducive. This gives rise to a problem for those who endorse the
following three theses: 
1. Evidence is normative (i.e., an agent’s available evidence affects which doxastic states
he or she is epistemically permitted or required to have);
2. Misleading evidence and false beliefs have many striking similarities;
3. False beliefs are not part of an agent’s evidence and they are not normative.
Many Non-Normative Truthers endorse 1 and 3.  However,  false beliefs and misleading
have many striking similarities (as stated in 2). Accordingly, it is expected that arguments
against putative false evidence, or the normativity of false beliefs, will also generalize to
misleading evidence. But this conflicts with either 1 or 3. So, Non-Normative Truthers find
themselves in an uncomfortable position. Why think that misleading evidence is normative,
but that false beliefs can’t be normative evidence?
Taking a closer look at existing arguments for the factivity of evidence revealed this
tension.  For  Non-Normative  Truthers,  false  beliefs  cannot  be  part  of  one’s  evidence.
Whether this is made explicit or not, many of their arguments revolve around the epistemic
undesirability of false beliefs. However, given the striking similarities between false beliefs
and misleading evidence, these arguments overgeneralize. In sections 2 to 4, we saw that
six arguments against putative false evidence overgeneralize. 
Of course,  as discussed in section 1.2,  restricting evidence to facts can be good
conceptual engineering.  For instance, facts have explanatory power, while falsehoods do
not.31 If P, then ~P can’t explain events in the world. Epistemologists might want a concept
that has both an explanatory power and a role in normative epistemic evaluation. Then,
restricting the concept of evidence to facts could be useful to some epistemologists. This
could,  for  instance,  clarify some philosophical  problems,  or simplify causal  theories  of
knowledge.32 But regimenting the concept of evidence so as to only include facts (for the
31 See section 1.2.
32 But note that good conceptual engineering could also support a non-factive concept of evidence. Perhaps
not restricting the concept of evidence to facts could clarify some philosophical problems, or simplify
some theories of normativity. All I am saying is that it could be the case that regimenting the concept of
evidence so as to only include facts is good conceptual engineering.
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sake  of  clarity,  simplicity,  and  the  like)  doesn’t  entail  that  false  beliefs  cannot  have
normative force.
In  summary,  some  Non-Normative  Truthers  think  that  evidence  is  normative
(including  misleading  evidence),  and  that  false  beliefs  are  not.  However,  the  kind  of
arguments  they  give  against  the  normativity  of  false  beliefs  overgeneralize  against  the
normativity  of  misleading  evidence.  So,  they  need  to  find  new arguments  against  the
normativity of false beliefs. However, in order to avoid overgeneralization, these arguments
must target some specific properties of false beliefs that are not shared with misleading
evidence. This will not be an easy task, since, from an epistemic point of view, false beliefs
and  misleading evidence  share  many relevant  properties.  Thus,  the  striking  similarities
between false beliefs and misleading evidence give rise to a serious challenge for Non-
Normative Truthers.
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